(Article on 'Morality' first published in the Cambridge Wagner Encyclopedia, ed. Nicholas Vazsonyi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013)
Luise Reuss-Belce as Fricka |
Historians often adopt a
tone of prurient hypocrisy with figures of whom they disapprove. The Russian
Empress Catherine the Great long endured persistent references to her
“scandalous” love life: that is, she was a successful female ruler with the
temerity to take lovers. It has become the practice for moral custodians, Frickas de nos jours, to berate Wagner for his easy way with other men’s
money and women. Understanding both as property is instructive, betokening a
narrow conception of “morality,” typical of the public opinion and commercial Press
by which Wagner not unreasonably considered himself hounded. Wagner believed
consistently that private property distorted every relationship between man and
man, likewise man and woman. Shortly before his death, he lauded Wilhelm Heinse
for having depicted in his novel, Ardinghello
(1787), a society in which institution of property had never been permitted (Cosima Wagner’s Diaries, 30 Sep 1882).
French socialism, directly
and through intermediaries such as Heinrich
Laube, August Röckel, and Mikhail Bakunin, was a pervading
influence. As early as Das Liebesverbot, Wagner tells us, “all
I cared about was to uncover the sinfulness of hypocrisy and the artificiality
of the judicial attitude toward morality” (My
Life, English translation, 83). Friedrich, prudishly shocked by popular
licentiousness, employs state power to enforce an unnatural moral code, whilst
transgressing it himself. Röckel, during their Dresden
discussions provided theoretical ballast: “On the basis of the socialist
theories of Proudhon and others … he constructed a whole new moral order of
things to which … he little by little converted me … I began to rebuild upon it
my hopes for the realization of my artistic ideals.” Wagner questioned Röckel
about his desire “to do away completely with the institution of marriage as we
knew it,” and was “particularly struck” by the claim that, only after
eradication of coercion by money, rank, and family prejudice, would sexual
morality be possible (My Life, 373-4).
He returned in his final essay “Über das Weibliche” to the subject. Marriage –
to Cosima, at least? – raised man and his moral faculties far above the animal
world, yet he was dragged far beneath it by “conventional marriage” (Konventionsheiraten), an “abuse” (Mißbrauch) founded upon property (Sämtliche
Schriften und Dichtungen, 12:343-4).
Self-justification?
Perhaps, for instance when Wagner tells us that Minna “became increasingly
perplexed at my seemingly incomprehensible conception of art and its relative importance,”
and at his “higher delicacy in regard to moral questions,” being “unable to
understand and approve my freedom of thought in such matters” (My Life, 130-1). Only up to a point,
though, for the contrast between Minna’s need for financial stability and the
moral purpose Wagner sought in art is real enough. That they were ultimately
unsuited need not send one scurrying for blame. There is, moreover, no
mistaking Wagner’s moral outrage at his perception of modern art as “industry,
its moral purpose the acquisition of money, its aesthetic purpose the
entertainment of the bored” (SSD, 3:
18).
Under the influence of Young German and Young Hegelian ideas,
most likely including Max Stirner’s anarchistic manifesto, The Ego and its Own (1844), Wagner created in the Ring
an artwork that dramatizes alternative moral possibilities. Fricka, Wagner
writes, represents custom (Sitte), (Letter
to Uhlig, 12 Nov. 1851). Her marriage
to Wotan is fruitless; his children
are sired outside wedlock. One of them, Sieglinde,
experiences both brutal treatment as chattel by her husband Hunding, and passionate
convention-flouting fulfillment with her twin brother, Siegmund. Fricka is outraged: “My heart trembles, my mind
reels: bridal embrace between brother and sister! When was it ever heard of
that siblings were lovers?” (Walküre,
II/i). As the gods’ – religion’s – hold on society falters, moral prohibitions
dependent upon their power are insisted upon ever more stridently. The gods
would go to ruin, Fricka insists, were her moral law not to be obeyed; they
already have. Wagner echoes Stirner and prefigures Nietzsche, providing a crucial link in the inversion of Hegel’s elevation of customary over
individual morality: “Note how a ‘moral man’ behaves, who today often thinks he
is through with God .… a customary-moral shudder will come over him at the
conception of one’s being allowed to touch his sister also as a woman.… Because
he believes in those moral
commandments” (Stirner, 45); and “They have rid themselves of the Christian
God, and thus believe that they must cling all the more firmly to Christian
morality … one must, in response to the smallest emancipation from theology,
reassert one’s position in awe-inspiring fashion as a moral fanatic” (Nietzsche,
80).
Mathilde Wesendonck by Karl Ferdinand Sohn (1850) |
What, then, of the
pre-eminent “affair,” with Mathilde
Wesendonck? One can deplore Wagner’s ingratitude towards her husband, Otto, who had offered considerable
financial support, only to find himself cuckolded – at least metaphysically. Wagner
opposed marriage as legal setting in stone or ring. Moreover, Wagner’s
insistence that the world owed him a living – why should someone be favored
because he dealt in silks instead of composing the Ring? – is borne out even in capitalist terms by the industry he
created for and bequeathed that world. It has done incalculably better from him
than vice versa.
One might also consider it
significant that, when Wagner condensed the action of Tristan und Isolde
into a few words for Mathilde Wesendonck, he did not even mention King Marke’s
forgiveness. Were the sacrifices of men such as Wesendonck and Hans von Bülow as naught to such a monstrous
ego? Yet Wagner sees the “custom of the time” leading to the sin of marriage
for politics’ sake. The action of Tristan is not, moreover, really of this
phenomenal world at all, but metaphysical. By now (1859), Wagner had partially
converted to a morality founded upon Schopenhauer’s
teaching. Though immediately taken by Schopenhauer’s aesthetics, “the moral principles” of The World as Will and Representation had been more difficult
initially to accept, “for here the annihilation of the Will and complete
self-abnegation are represented as the only true means of redemption from the
constricting bonds of individuality in its dealings with the world” (My Life, 509). Either way – in practice,
both – Wagner rejected the dictates of bourgeois morality.
See also:
Mark Berry, “The Positive
Influence of Wagner upon Nietzsche,” The
Wagner Journal, 2.2 (2008): 11-28.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols / The Anti-Christ,
tr. R.J. Hollingdale, with an introduction by Michael Tanner (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1990).
Max Stirner, The Ego and its Own, tr. Steven Byington, ed. David Leopold (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
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